Braided in Fire

Beware of Misinformation

READERS BEWARE: INFORMATION FOUND ELSEWHERE ABOUT THE EVENTS OF THE SOMMOCOLONIA BATTLE IS APT TO BE INCORRECT 

Most sites on the internet, military histories and other sources of information regarding the Sommocolonia battle of December 26, 1944 are full of errors. This is understandable when you realize that there are a number of mistakes in Lt. Fox’s Medal of Honor citation issued by the Pentagon. Naturally, anyone writing about the engagement assumes that the Pentagon description is correct. There is no mistake about Fox’s heroic action in the citation. But there are a number of errors about the surrounding circumstances. Solace Wales corrects the mistakes in relating the story in Braided in Fire and she proves in the book’s Afterword that she is correcting the record.

If, before reading Braided in Fire, you wish to explore the story of the battle on the internet or from other sources, it is advisable to read the below Afterword first. However, it contains a few “spoilers” in regards to what happens during the battle, so if you’re content to read the book first and then look at outside information, you may wish to save the Afterword for when you finish the book.

Solace Wales

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Afterword

Prominent Veterans of the 366th

Apart from two generals, the 366th Infantry Regiment can claim an extraordinary number of members who, after WWII, had distinguished civilian careers. In a 1975 interview Col. Queen had this to say: “General Almond may have the succeeded in decimating the ranks of the 366th and wounding their pride, but he never destroyed their self-respect . . . among the members of the 366th were . . .” He starts his impressive list with Senator Edward Brooke, elected Senator of Massachusetts at a time when the state was only 3% African American. Among others, Col. Queen missed naming Lt. Samuel Wilbert Tucker, a Civil Rights lawyer who, in 1968, won the case Green vs. New Kent County School Board he argued before the Supreme Court considered “the second most important civil rights case after Brown in 1954.” (see Note 248) (For a fuller picture of the extraordinary accomplishments of 366th veterans see my list of prominent veterans of the 366th (see Note 249) at braidedinfire.com.)

Explanation of the Variations to the Congressional Medal of Honor Awarded to First Lieutenant John R. Fox

Following is the full text of the citation in which I have highlighted in bold those sentences which I will discuss further.

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The president of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of The Congress the Medal of Honor to

FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHN R. FOX
UNITED STATES ARMY

for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty:

First Lieutenant John R. Fox distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism at the risk of his own life on 26 December 1944 in the Serchio River Valley Sector, in the vicinity of Sommocolonia, Italy. Lieutenant Fox was a member of Cannon Company, 366th Infantry, 92nd Infantry Division, acting as forward observer, while attached to the 598th Field Artillery Battalion. Christmas Day in the Serchio Valley was spent in positions which had been occupied for some weeks. During Christmas night, there was a gradual influx of enemy soldiers in civilian clothes and by early morning the town was largely in enemy hands. An organized attack by uniformed German formations was launched around 0400 hours, 26 December 1944. Reports were received that the area was being heavily shelled by everything the Germans had, and although most of the U.S. infantry forces withdrew from the town, Lieutenant Fox and members of his observer party remained behind on the second floor of a house, directing defensive fires. Lieutenant Fox reported at 0800 hours that the Germans were in the streets and attacking in strength. He called for artillery fire increasingly close to his own position. He told his battalion commander, “That was just where I wanted it. Bring it in 60 yards!” His commander protested that there was a heavy barrage in the area and the bombardment would be too close. Lieutenant Fox gave his adjustment, requesting that the barrage be fired. The distance was cut in half. The Germans continued to press forward in large numbers, surrounding the position. Lieutenant Fox again called for artillery fire with the commander protesting again, stating, “Fox, that will be on you!” The last communication from Lieutenant Fox was, “Fire It! There’s more of them than there are of us. Give them hell!” The bodies of Lieutenant Fox and his party were found in the vicinity of his position when his position was taken. This action, by Lieutenant Fox, at the cost of his own life, inflicted heavy casualties, causing the deaths of approximately 100 German soldiers, thereby delaying the advance of the enemy until infantry and artillery units could be reorganized to meet the attack. Lieutenant Fox’s extraordinarily valorous actions exemplify the highest traditions of the military service.

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The following misinformation also appeared in Lt. Fox’s Distinguished Service Cross awarded in 1982:

“An organized attack by uniformed German formations was launched around 0400 hours, 26 December 1944 . . .” would be correct if it referred to the approximate time that the first artillery fire of the day arrived from the German sector. But it wasn’t until 5:40 am that Germans (and Austrians) in uniform had a skirmish with partisans on the hillock at the north end of Sommocolonia just outside the village proper.

“During Christmas night, there was a gradual influx of enemy soldiers in civilian clothes and by early morning the town was largely in enemy hands . . .”

Subsequent American military histories dealing with the action naturally repeat that enemy soldiers in civilian clothes infiltrated the village during the night.  (see Note 250) But no Italian military histories make this mistake. Partisan soldiers who fought in Sommocolonia have confirmed that there was no such presence that night or in the battle the following morning. Nor did the villagers see any Axis fighters dressed as civilians. (Some partisans, dressed as civilians, arrived Christmas night to relieve partisan soldiers stationed in the village. Clearly an American present mistook these men for the enemy). German soldiers had nearly encircled the village Christmas night but did not enter the village after 7:00 am when Rock and the villagers heard them.

The third sentence needs to be taken in parts: “Reports were received that the area was being shelled by everything the Germans had . . .” is probably true, even though by that date, the German arsenal was depleted (it did not compare with the Americans’). But certainly, the Axis forces were using artillery and mortar fire abundantly.

“. . . and although most of the U.S. infantry forces withdrew from the town, Lieutenant Fox and members of his observer party remained behind . . .” The 370th battalion 92nd Division, which represented the majority of US troops holding the village, was indeed ordered to withdraw by the commanding lieutenant colonel at midnight on the 25th, well before the German attack. But the wording here makes it sound like Fox and members of his observer party chose to remain behind. Whatever he might have chosen, Lt. Fox was ordered to stay along with two platoons of fellow 366th Infantry Regiment soldiers, who were commanded to “hold at all costs.”

“Lieutenant Fox and members of his observer party remained behind on the second floor of a house, directing defensive fires . . .” Fox was in La Rocca tower, not on the second floor of a house.

Otis Zachary, at Cannon Company’s Fire Direction Center in communication with Fox at the end, had the mathematical co-ordinates for Fox’s location and assumed they represented the same OP (outpost) he had occupied as forward observer in Sommocolonia which was the second floor of a house. Zachary (who was interviewed about the action in 1982 by investigators for Fox’s DSC ‘Distinguished Service Cross’ and again in 1996 by the Shaw team working in conjunction with the Army in establishing worthy MOH winners) was very likely the source for the U.S. Army’s statement on location. But the evidence is clear that instead Zachary had the co-ordinates for La Rocca tower:

There are several strong clues indicating that this was so (see Note 251) but the most conclusive evidence comes from an article in Buffalo Association Veterans Newsletter, 9/89) “On the Point with Lt. Fox,” written by William Wyatt, Team Leader, Survey Sergeant 598 Field Artillery Battalion, 92nd Division, which states unequivocally that Fox was in a tower. Wyatt wrote that, prior to going up to his frontline duty in Sommocolonia, Fox trained with him at the 598th Field Artillery Headquarters, in Loppia. Fox, a very well-prepared artilleryman, had not been a forward observer before and needed specifics in directing fire from that position.

Though I searched for Wyatt to interview, I never found him. But I did find Sergeant Emmett Saunders, of Washington D.C., who worked with Wyatt at a 598th Field Artillery. He confirmed that Wyatt trained a number of Forward Observers and would be the one to know their precise locations—beyond the co-ordinates shown on the battery maps. Saunders said Wyatt would remain in close communication with the forward observers he trained while they were on duty. Saunders was present when Fox called and made his request to Wyatt (whom Fox spoke with before Zachary.)

Curiously, the tower was also confirmed as the location of the American forward observer in the diary of an Austrian soldier, Hans Burtscher, non-commissioned officer, 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion of Kampfgruppe IV Hoch Pioneers, who was in the battle. Burtscher wrote:

The artillery observer of the enemy has to be on top of the upper tower in our opinion. He is guiding the artillery splendidly to our damage. . . . The artillery shells are now striking very nearby, near the groups lying behind us. The biggest danger are the shells bursting near trees . . .

Our marksmen, experienced soldiers, mostly from Steiermark, Salzburg and Karnten (regions of Austria) are given the command to finish off the enemy artillery observer in the tower . . .

Via word of mouth we hear that our marksmen were able to shoot the observer in the tower . . . (see Note 252)

It seemed unlikely that this claim of the Austrian marksmen was true until July 2019 when James Pratt forwarded to me a photocopy of John R. Fox’s ‘Report of Burial’ at the US Military Cemetery at Castelfiorentino dated January 7, 1945. The document Pratt had recently uncovered reads on the ‘cause of death’ line: “GSW [Gun Shot Wound] in chest.” Because Fox’s body was also hit by artillery shrapnel and aerial bombing, there is a very slight chance that the cause of death determination was incorrect, but in all probability the bullet came first. Fox was likely attempting escape when he was shot. (Several important pieces of information have shown up only recently and I’ve been working on Braided in Fire for thirty years! See Note 253)

Finally, regarding the citation says that Fox’s action “. . . inflicted heavy casualties, causing the deaths of approximately 100 German soldiers, thereby delaying the advance of the enemy until infantry and artillery units could be reorganized to meet the attack.”

I obtained from the ‘History of the Resistance Institute’ in Lucca a list of 41 Axis soldiers’ names who died in the Sommocolonia battle. But the document is titled “Partial List” so clearly more than 41 died. It seems safe to conjecture that at least 10 more died than are on the list. Lt. Col. Vittorio Biondi estimates the German dead between 70–80 (see Note 254) I have not found any evidence that the number would have been that high. But even if the Axis dead numbered 80, they certainly did not all die as a result of Fox’s artillery call. Several died in the mine field, a number died at the hands of the partisans and others died in the battle taking place in the village streets. It is impossible to know how many died as a result of John Fox’s heroic action. Lt. Fox’s Distinguished Service Cross (awarded in 1982) states “. . . Later, when a counterattack retook the position from the Germans, Lieutenant Fox’s body was found along with the bodies of approximately 100 German soldiers.” (see Note 255) This ‘approximately 100’ figure is understandably repeated in several American military books. But we know from Italian civilians forced to be stretcher bearers that the Germans carried their dead north with them. When the Gurkhas with the Allies retook Sommocolonia, no German bodies were found (except for 8 buried in shallow graves). For a full account of the dead, German, Italian and American, resulting from the Sommocolonia battle, see braidedinfire.com #155.

It does seem likely that Fox’s action, together with the efforts of his fellow 366th soldiers and XIth Zone partisans, helped delay “the advance of the enemy until infantry and artillery units could be reorganized to meet the attack.” Part of the reorganization involved allowing time for Allied units—like Cannon Company in Loppia—to retreat. It also allowed time for civilians in the Barga area time to flee south. Consider that the Axis troops entered Sommocolonia at 7:00 am on December 26th but did not make it into Barga until 24 hours later. It’s a distance of about three miles which would normally take these specially trained mountain soldiers less than an hour to cover.

The mistakes in Fox’s citation are clearly due mainly to lack of access to local Italian sources. And it cannot have helped that the initial fact-finding for his DSC award took place 38 years after his action. Neither the mistakes in his citation nor the cause of his death in any way diminishes the heroism of Lt. John Fox. He could not fully know the results of his action, but he gave himself with extraordinary fullness to his dire situation.